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Honda’s efforts to establish a supplier 
base in the USA, which involved several 
visits to Honda and seven of its sup-
pliers between 1992 and 1994, with a 
follow-up in 2011.  
Rude awakening
From the 1950s to the 1980s, the close 
relationships between Nissan and 
its suppliers had many benefits for 
Nissan. Suppliers would start prepa-
rations for a new contract before they 
were formally awarded it. They usually 
accepted last-minute requests for pro-
duction schedule and delivery changes, 
overtime work, and even engineering 
changes, without demanding any ad-
ditional compensation from Nissan.
Over time, however, these close 
relationships gradually devolved into 
a source of competitive disadvantage 
for Nissan, contributing to its finan-
cial losses in nine out of 10 years in 
the 1990s. Parts costs rose beyond the 
global average. Yet even when factory 
utilisation slipped to 50 per cent, the 
company maintained the same num-
bers of suppliers. 
Some of the practices had grown 
clearly dysfunctional over time. In the 
purchasing department, for example, 
purchasers were in charge of a specific 
company, not a specific product group. 
As a purchaser, I might be sitting in 
a meeting and discussing where we 
source the radiators for a new model, 
and advocate my supplier simply be-
cause he was my supplier (who, not co-
incidentally, was also the supplier of 
various personal favours, such as golf 
trips or a future job after my retirement 
from Nissan). 
To answer this question, we com-
pared the experiences of Nissan Motor 
Co. in Japan following the establish-
ment of the Renault–Nissan alliance 
during the period when the Nissan 
keiretsu (supply chain family) was dis-
mantled, with that of Honda Motor 
Company in North America, early in 
the development of its North American 
supply base.
The Nissan insights were based on 
my own research, a series of face-to-
face interviews I conducted in Japan 
and France with key actors over a 12-
year period between 2000 and 2012. I 
also worked on the production line of a 
Tier 2 Nissan supplier for a few weeks. 
The suppliers interviewed (seven first-
tier and two second-tier Nissan suppli-
ers) were selected to ensure a diverse 
set of strong and weak keiretsu affilia-
tions, different relationship durations, 
and primary product and production 
process. Most interviews were conduct-
ed in Japanese. My co-authors followed 
On the one hand, most scholars say 
there are important advantages to 
deep trust in the buyer-supplier rela-
tionship: reduced monitoring costs, 
superior information sharing routines, 
and lower transaction costs.  On the 
other hand, too much trust can have 
negative consequences: diminished in-
formation gathering due to the percep-
tion that not much vigilance is needed; 
complacency; and burdensome obliga-
tions between the parties. 
In a paper I recently published with 
John Paul MacDuffie, a professor of 
management at the Wharton School 
of the University of Pennsylvania in 
Philadelphia, and Susan Helper, a pro-
fessor of economics at Case Western 
Reserve University in Cleveland, 
we looked at the experience of two 
Japanese automakers and concluded 
that the best business relationship 
should be neither too trusting nor too 
sceptical. But how do you strike the 
right balance? 
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Between friends and loved ones, more trust is mostly a good thing. 
But how about trust between business partners? Until recently, the 
dominant view has been that investments in trust generally result 
in positive returns. However, some of my research suggests that 
this may not actually be the case.
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“Optimal inter-organisational trust is a
balance of powerful and opposed forces…”
Honda’s win
The example of Honda offers a very 
different story but a somewhat similar 
moral. Honda’s start in the USA, first in 
manufacturing motorcycles (1978) and 
later cars (1982), was not auspicious. In 
Japan, the company had suffered from 
being overly committed to its suppliers 
in past recessions, and had an aware-
ness of the potential dark side of trust. 
Honda sought to select self-reliant 
partners who could be responsive to 
its current and future needs. As a sign 
of good faith, they looked for a willing-
ness to make investments in new tech-
nologies and new capabilities, with-
out explicit contractual commitments 
from Honda.
Most suppliers did not have a clear 
sense of what kind of company Honda 
was, and in addition, their long expe-
riences with the adversarial purchas-
ing behaviour of American automak-
ers had taught them to expect the 
worst. Suppliers saw ulterior motives in 
Honda’s insistence on learning every de-
tail about their production process and, 
especially, their costs. Nor did they like 
the idea of making a substantial invest-
ment without a contract.
Despite that rocky beginning, Honda 
still developed stable, trusting relations 
with small local suppliers within a dec-
ade of opening its first US auto assembly 
plant in 1982. It also appeared to have 
avoided the traps of complacency, blind-
ness, and excess obligation. It did so by 
implementing its Honda Way philosophy 
and a supplier development initiative 
known as BP (the acronym has many 
referents, eg, “best practices”, “best pro-
cess”, “best profits” and “best partner”). 
also had its problems. Suppliers felt 
betrayed that Nissan “did not keep its 
promises” to share the company’s re-
stored prosperity, despite the fact that 
Ghosn had explicitly said Nissan was no 
longer making such promises. 
In 2004, faced with their opposition, 
Ghosn began to back-pedal, publicly 
announcing the return to some of its 
previous keiretsu practices, such as a 
long-term orientation, equity holding, 
and technical assistance to suppliers. 
Even now, a decade later, the com-
pany still struggles to gain the right 
balance between too much and too 
little trust.  
When Carlos Ghosn signed on as 
CEO, part of his remit was to restruc-
ture those cosy relationships. To sig-
nal a clean break from the past, he an-
nounced a dramatic restructuring of 
the supply base. Shares in all but four 
of the nearly 1,400 affiliated companies 
in Nissan’s keiretsu were to be sold, and 
Nissan’s supplier roster slashed from 
1,145 to 600. The survivors would be 
required to reduce costs by 20 per cent 
within three years, without expecting 
any help from Nissan.  
From Nissan’s point of view, the cost 
cutting was a success. But it turned out 
that a purely transactional relationship 
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"…the best business relationship should be 
neither too trusting nor too sceptical. But how 
do you strike the right balance?"
By contrast, in Honda’s early dealings 
with small US suppliers, executives 
praised the suppliers for being so re-
sponsive to its demands. 
Finally, we learned something 
about ways to regain trust. This may 
be achieved either through a dra-
matic process of reorientation, as 
at Nissan, or by recalibration, as at 
Honda. Reorientation is often revolu-
tionary, a clear break from past pro-
cesses. Recalibration, by contrast, is 
perpetual but low-key – it consists of 
continuous, small changes that enable 
the relationship to stay near optimal 
trust. Sometimes the kind of reorien-
tation that Nissan undertook is neces-
sary, but it’s much tougher on the com-
pany than ongoing recalibration. It’s a 
bit like maintaining your weight – in 
the end, it’s better to make a few minor 
adjustments every few weeks than to 
gain 20 kilos and go on a crash diet to 
lose it all at once. 
Optimal inter-organisational trust 
is a balance of powerful and opposed 
forces: faith vs. scepticism, favourit-
ism vs. impartiality, contentment vs. 
exigency, and loyalty vs. opportun-
ism. The stories of Nissan and Honda 
suggest that the best way to avoid a 
ruptured relationship is essentially by 
continuous recalibration to prevent 
reaching the point where it needs to 
be repaired. 
This article draws its inspiration 
from the paper Reorienting and 
Recalibrating Inter-organizational 
Relationships: Strategies for Achieving 
Optimal Trust, Organization Studies, 
written by Merieke Stevens, John Paul 
MacDuffie and Susan Helper and pub-
lished in Organization Studies, Volume 
36, Issue 9 (July 2015), p. 1237-1264. 
DOI: 10.1177/0170840615585337
Merieke Stevens is Assistant Professor, 
Department of Technology & Operations 
Management, Rotterdam School of 
Management, Erasmus University. 
 EMAIL  mstevens@rsm.nl
Now, as the business grew, Honda’s 
managers began to add a set of larg-
er suppliers to their supply chain, on 
similar terms as their smaller suppli-
ers. The new suppliers were also scepti-
cal of the proposition that they should 
make significant investments without 
a contract, but this time, Honda pro-
posed starting with small contracts as 
a way to build trust gradually. In addi-
tion, the company was also generous 
with their technical advice.  
Scepticism and trust
Our comparison of Nissan and Honda’s 
experience led us to think that maybe 
companies should look at trust as an 
inverted U – beneficial within a certain 
range of behaviour, but potentially 
negative outside that band.
Instead of trying to achieve perfect 
trust, maybe the more productive ap-
proach would be to try to maintain an 
optimal level of trust instead – enough 
trust to enable the company and the 
supplier to work towards mutual goals, 
but not so much that the company nev-
er double-checks the supplier’s prices 
and specifications.
A second lesson we drew from these 
cases is that it’s important to give credit 
where credit is due. When Nissan did 
not recognise the role of suppliers in 
achieving its restructuring goals ahead 
of schedule, suppliers became bitter. 
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"…the best way to avoid a ruptured relationship 
is essentially by continuous recalibration…"
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